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Changes in oil prices are determined by supply and 
demand-side factors that bear on their dynamics. In 
recent months, for instance, the weakness in the global 
demand for oil, largely linked to the slowdown in China 
brought on by the COVID-19 crisis, has tended to depress 
oil prices. In addition to the dynamics stemming from 
cyclical fluctuations of the economy, oil prices are regularly 
affected by geopolitical events. A case in point are 
conflicts linked to the Middle East, among others. The 
frequency of such tensions has tended to increase since 
May 2018 (when the United States withdrew from the 
nuclear agreement),1 with some episodes of particular 
intensity in late 2019 and early 2020.2 Given the 
significance of the region for global oil production and 
exports,3 this box analyses the hypothetical impact of 
new geopolitical conflicts arising in the Middle East on oil 
prices. It further discusses some factors that tend to 
mitigate this impact. 
The effect a geopolitical event has on oil prices depends 
on the volume of output affected by the event and its 
duration, as well as the economic conditions under which 
it arises. Indeed, the main events of this type in the Middle 
East since 1973 differ in terms of these dimensions, and 
they have thus exerted heterogeneous effects on oil prices 
(see Chart 1).4 Despite this heterogeneity, a common 
characteristic of all these events is that they have been 
transitory, leading to declines in output, on average, in the 
four months following the event, which tend to be 
progressively reversed by the influence of mitigating 
factors. These include most notably the spare capacity of 
other global producers, the use of inventories and the 
strategic reserves of certain countries. 
On the basis of these characteristics, Chart 4 shows the 
reaction of oil prices to two hypothetical geopolitical 
scenarios, which differ in terms of their intensity.5 In the 
less adverse, “moderate” scenario, disruption to oil 
production of the order of 800,000 barrels per day (bpd), 
i.e. 0.8% of global output, is assumed, equivalent to the 
combined current exports of Iran (around 300,000 bpd) 
and of northern Iraq (500,000 bpd) (see Chart 2). In the 
“adverse” scenario, the shock is considered to affect 4% 
of global oil output. That would be tantamount to adding 
to the disruption of the previous scenario another shock 
equivalent to the events spreading to the rest of Iraq, 
which is the second-ranked producer and exporter of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). The exercise does not consider much more 
extreme events, e.g. a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,6 
a strategic channel through which almost 15 million 
barrels are moved every day (see Chart 3), since there are 
no precedents for an event of this nature. 
The results of the simulations indicate that, following the 
event, crude oil prices would increase in the first month by 
a maximum amount of $38 under the adverse scenario 
and $6 under the moderate one. After peaking, prices 
would fall. Relative to the baseline scenario, the average 
increase in six months would stand at around $20 under 
the adverse scenario and at $4 under the moderate 
scenario (see, once more, Chart 4). 
However, the results of the simulations should be taken 
as an upper bound to the rise in crude oil prices in such 
episodes. In particular, the estimates shown stem from 
average historical patterns, when there is actually evidence 
that the sensitivity of oil prices to supply and demand 
shocks might be lower at present, i.e. the aforementioned 
mitigating factors might now be acting with greater 
intensity. Prominent among these factors is OPEC’s high 
spare capacity (currently estimated at 3.4 million bpd), 
the notable levels of global inventories and strategic 
reserves (equivalent to around 92 days of global output 
for the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development), and the boom, since 2011, 
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1  The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was adopted in 2015 with the aim of reducing Iran’s uranium enrichment in exchange for lifting the economic 
sanctions on the country.
2  The oil market has recently been affected by several episodes of particular intensity, including most notably the attack on Saudi oil facilities, which 
temporarily affected 6% of total output last September, the siege of the US embassy in Baghdad in late 2019 and the US response to these attacks 
in early 2020.
3   Although the significance of the region has diminished owing to the growth of shale oil in the United States, it continues to produce 28.5% of global 
oil output. 
4  See J. D. Hamilton (2011), Historical oil shocks, National Bureau of Economic Research.
5   The calculations are made using a Bayesian structural VAR model. In this model, shocks are identified by means of sign restrictions. This enables a 
distinction to be drawn between supply-side shocks, global demand, precautionary demand and idiosyncratic demand factors of the oil market. The 
model is estimated with monthly data using a sample commencing in January 1980. 
6  A blockade of the Strait of Hormuz might entail a reduction of around 10% in global production, even if the pipelines of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates and Iraq were to function at maximum capacity. 
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SOURCES: International Energy Agency, Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
a The figure reflects the maximum fall in total oil production during the geopolitical shock indicated by Hamilton (2011), except for the Iranian revolution 
and the Saudi Arabia oil attack, which were estimated in-house. The duration of the shocks varies significantly, as shown by the width of the events 
(blue bands).
b Considering a temporary drop in production of 0.8 million and 4 million barrels per day in the moderate and adverse scenarios, respectively. The 
shock recedes gradually over 4 months.
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in shale oil production in the United States, which has 
converted this country into the leading world producer, 
ahead of Saudi Arabia and of Russia. In particular, this 
latter factor has been playing a growing role in oil price 
trends in the past decade.7 Compared with traditional 
crude oil production, the investment period and time to 
maturity of shale oil is much shorter, allowing supply to 
react swiftly to shocks that tend to raise crude prices. 
This makes supply fairly elastic in the medium term8 and 
is conducive to price stability. Hence, price increases 
tend to go hand in hand with the rapid drilling of new 
wells in less than six months (see Chart 5). Moreover, the 
productivity of North American producers has increased 
considerably since late 2015.9
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7  For further information, see D. Santabárbara (2017), “The oil market: recent developments and outlook”, Analytical Article, Economic Bulletin, 3/2017, 
Banco de España. 
8   A model developed by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to estimate shale oil production in the United States shows that, although supply is 
inelastic in the short term, it is fairly elastic after two years (M. Lasky (2016), The Outlook for US Production of Shale Oil, Congressional Budget Office).
9   As a result, fewer wells are needed to maintain production. Extraction in the first month of operation has doubled since 2007 and the rise in production 
persists throughout their life cycle. See R. Decker, A. Flaaen,  and M. Tito (2016). Unraveling the Oil Conundrum: Productivity Improvements and Cost 
Declines in the US Shale Oil Industry, FEDS Notes, Washington, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 22 March.
